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Introduction
An equilibrium of a dynamic economic model maps the history of a vector of k economic shocks w t into a vector of n observables y t , y t = d ¡ w t ¢ , where w t represents the whole history of shocks w t up to period t. The economic shocks affect the fundamental elements of the theory: preferences, technology, informational sets, government policy, measurement errors, etc.
The observables are all variables that the researcher has access to. The mapping d (·) is the outcome of the equilibrium behavior of the agents in the model, captured by their optimal decision rules and the consistency conditions like resource constraints and market clearing. Via the mapping d (·), an economic theory tightly relates shocks and observables.
Often, we are interested in dynamic models such that d (·) has a linear form, y t = d (L) w t , where L is the lag operator. For simplicity of exposition, w t will be an i.i.d. normal random variable, w t ∼ N (0, I) , and y t will have a zero mean. We call this representation of y t the MA representation with respect to the economic shocks. There are two ways to obtain 2 equilibrium representations of this form. One is to compute a first-order approximation of a nonlinear model around the deterministic steady state.
A second possibility is to derive y t = d (L) w t as the representation of a class of dynamic models with linear transition laws and quadratic preferences.
Since y t is a linear function of the history of w t , y t always "reflects" w t .
Does the history of observables "reveal" the history of economic shocks?
A way to answer to the query is to check the zeros of det (d (L)). If the zeros are outside the unit circle, we say that d (L) has an inverse that is "one-sided" in the past and present values of y t , which implies that the Hilbert space spanned by the history of y t , H(y t ), equals the Hilbert Space spanned by the history of w t , H(w t ). 1 There is alternative approach to answer our question. Consider the VAR representation of the observables, A (L) y t = a t , with a t = y t − b E ¡ y t |y t−1 ¢ being the VAR innovations. We can check whether the Hilbert space spanned by the history of a t , H(a t ), equals H(w t ). Since a t is con-
, this approach and the one based on
exists a procedure to make the impulse-response of the VAR to match 1 H(x t ) is the Hilbert space spanned by the completion of the square summable linear combinations of current and past values of x t .
with the impulses responses of a VAR.
To fix ideas, consider a simple, unidimensional example. Assume that our economic model implies the following d (L):
An AR(∞) of this y t process has a MA representation of y t in terms of the AR innovations:
The impulse-response function implied by the economic model, (1, 2, 0, 0, ...) ,
is different from the impulse-response function associated with the AR representation, (2, 1, 0, 0, ...).
Why are the two impulse-response functions so different? First, note that a t belongs to the Hilbert space spanned by the history of y t :
is not invertible. In fact, w t belongs to the Hilbert space spanned
In this simple example, invertibility is determined by whether the coefficient in front of w t−1 is bigger or smaller than one in absolute value. In general, however, dynamic models have more than one observable, more than one economic shock, and more lags. These complications expand the ways in that the observables may partially conceal the economic shocks.
At the same time, more observables mean more information and more possibilities to recover the economic shocks.
To analyze the multidimensional case, we consider two recursive representations of the observables. One representation links observables to economic shocks: 
where b
is the best linear predictor of x t and K is steadystate Kalman filter gain.
Is it possible to recover the history of economic shocks w t from the history of VAR innovations a t ? The answer depends on A, B, C, and D, i.e., on the structural parameters and the cross-equation restrictions implied by our economic theory. If the answer is affirmative, we have
Stacking both recursive representations together:
When D −1 exists, 2 by substituting · x t b x t¸0 into the second equation,
where a t = G² t for any G matrix such that GG 0 = Ea t a 0 t and
Therefore, the question: "Is it possible to recover the history of economic shocks w t from the history of VAR innovations a t ?" asks to check whether the zeros of 
Theorem 1 tells us that to check if the model is invertible, we only need to compute the eigenvalues of A − BD −1 C (since we only consider stable systems, the eigenvalues of A are always less than one).
Now, let us assume that the model is invertible, i.e. the eigenvalues of
A − BD −1 C are all less than one in absolute value. How do we recover w t from a t ? Theorem 2 provides us with the answer. 
Theorem 2 says that for a particular subset of invertible models, those with the eigenvalues of A − BD −1 C are strictly less than one, we have that Σ = 0, i.e., we can perfectly forecast the states of the model, and we can calculate the Kalman gain immediately from K = BD −1 .
8 How can we use Theorem 2 to recover w t from a t ? If K = BD −1 , then:
Therefore, we need only to set G = D to find w t using only contemporaneous a t . The choice of G is unique only up to postmultiplication by an orthogonal matrix. Also, with this identification, the impulse-response function of the VAR will match those of the economic model. 
A Model of the Great Depression
where 1 ≤ λ f,t < ∞ is a stochastic process that controls the elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods.
Intermediate goods are produced by competitive monopolists using cap-9 ital K jt and labor l jt according to the production function:
where Φ is a fixed cost, ε t is a stationary technology shock, and z t = µz t−1
is the trend growth rate in technology. The intermediate good producers
fix their prices P jt subject to Calvo pricing frictions. In each period, a fraction 1 − ξ p of intermediate good producers reoptimize its price, while the fraction ξ p keeps the prices of the last period, indexed by past inflation,
The rental price of capital is P r k t and the wage W t . The firm must finance a fraction ψ k of the capital payments and a fraction ψ l of the labor payments in advance through a working-capital loan with interest rate R t .
Capital is produced by competitive firms that buy old capital x t at price
and investment goods I t at price P t to produce new capital x t+1 , with a technology x t+1 = x t + F (I t , I t−1 ) that reflects the adjustment costs of investment. Because the rate of transformation between x t+1 and x t is 1, the selling price of new capital is also Q K 0 ,t . Aggregate capital evolves
, where δ is the depreciation factor.
Capital services are provided by entrepreneurs. At the end of period t, an entrepreneur has a net worth N t . With N t and a bank loan, the entrepreneur buys an amount of capital K t+1 . After the purchase, the capital becomes ωK t+1 , where log ω is an i.i.d. normal random variable with zero mean and (stochastic) standard deviation σ t . The value of ω is known after the purchase of capital while the value σ t is known before.
After observing the shock, the entrepreneur rents its capital at the level of utilization, u t+1 , to maximize its profit,
where a (u t+1 ) ωK t+1 is the convex cost of utilizing capital at rate u t+1 .
After production, the entrepreneur sells undepreciated capital to capital producers, pays off debt to banks, and receives a transfer W e t . These three elements determine its new net worth N t+1 . At the end of the period, a fraction 1 − γ t of entrepreneurs dies, their net worth distributed among households, and a fraction 1 − γ t of new entrepreneurs is born. Mortality ensures that the credit market restrictions remain binding by bounding (almost surely) the distribution of capital.
A representative, perfectly competitive bank engages in two activities.
First, it borrows an amount B t from households at a nominal rate of return R e t+1 to lend it to the entrepreneurs at rate Z t+1 . The parameters of the entrepreneur's loan are chosen to maximize its utility, subject to zero profits for the bank in each state of nature and to the requirement that R e t+1 is uncontingent in time t + 1 shocks. 
where x b is a constant. Demand deposits pay an interest rate R at . Finally, even if there is a representative bank, we can define an interbank interest rate R b t at which, otherwise identical banks would lend to each other.
There is a continuum of households indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] which consume C t , allocate their wealth between currency M t , demand deposits, and time deposits, and supply specialized labor h i,t to maximize its utility:
where b generates habit persistence , ζ t+1 is a unit-mean leisure shock,
is the utility from money and deposits, υ t is a unit-mean liquidity shocks, and θ t is a stochastic parameter that controls preferences for deposits.
At the beginning of each period, households split their money, M b t , between currency and bank deposits A t , such that
Since the central bank credits bank deposits with X t units of money, we have
As income, households get wages, the interest payments in various form of loans, profits from firms, and net worth of deceased entrepreneurs. They use the resources for consumption, money accumulation, saving, and to pay a lump sum to balance the government budget.
Since the household is a monopolistic supplier of its labor, it will optimally set its wage W t given Calvo's frictions, adjusting with probability 1 − ξ w . Otherwise, they index the wage by past inflation and technological progress W j,t = π t−1 µW j,t−1 . The different types of labor are aggregated in a labor composite by a representative, perfectly competitive firm with
where 1 ≤ λ w < ∞. Finally, there is government consumption G t = z t g where g is a constant and a monetary authority that sets
There are eight exogenous shocks in the model: the monopoly power degree, λ f,t ; productivity of bank reserves, ξ t ; leisure shock, ζ t ; liquidity shocks, υ t ; preferences for deposits, θ t ; productivity shock, ε t ; riskiness for entrepreneurs, σ t ; and mortality rate, γ t . The shocks (some in levels, some transformed) follow an ARMA(1,1) process. The variable x t depends on the eight exogenous shocks through a linear feedback rule.
An equilibrium of the economy can be defined in a standard way and approximated by linearization.
Results
CMR estimate their model using 13 variables:
where d c t and d we know that the system is non-invertible, with too few, we suffer from stochastic singularity.
To achieve a square system, we can proceed in three ways. One is to increase the number of observables. Since we want to use CMR's data set, we do not follow this route. Second, we can eliminate 8 of the measurement errors and keep 5 of them. This alternative seems arbitrary to us. There is no compelling reason to think that some variables are observed with measurement error and some are not. Finally, the third alternative is to drop 5 of the observables and keep only 8 of them. This strategy seems the most natural for our purposes.
But then, we face a second choice: which 8 variables to keep? One approach is to compute all different combinations of 8 variables out of 13 and study, for each and one of them, whether the resulting VAR is invertible or not. For completeness, we undertook this exercise. However, because of space considerations, we report only a summary of the results for two different VARs, an exercise that is sufficient to exemplify the method.
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First, we select:
.
Second, we select:
Note how the only difference between the two sets of variables is the substitution of the (log of) currency-to-demand deposit ratio, log d c t , a variable recording a quantity, for the external finance premium, P e t , a variable recording a price.
We take our structural parameter values from CMR's estimates, which are a combination of maximum likelihood and calibration. With those values, we run the code kindly lend to us by Larry Christiano to compute the solution of the model and, with that solution, generate the corresponding A, B, C, and D's. The A and B will be the same for both sets of observables while the C and D will differ in one row.
What happens if we apply our simple check of invertibility to those two sets of matrices? For X 1 t , we find that the model is invertible: the biggest eigenvalue is 0.976. However, for X 2 t , the model is not invertible: the biggest eigenvalue is 1.030.
What are the consequences of this lack of invertibility? First, the researcher cannot obtain the exact value of the states even with a time series for observables of infinite length, i.e., Σ is different from zero. Second, the variance-covariance matrix of the one-step ahead forecast from the VAR is bigger than the one from the true model. The covariance matrix of the innovations a t is Ea t a 0 t = CΣC 0 + DD 0 , while the variance-covariance matrix of one-step ahead errors from the true model is DD 0 . In the non-invertible case, since Σ is different from zero, we have the extra quadratic term CΣC 0 .
Third, the impulse response functions obtained from the model and from the VAR are different.
We finish by emphasizing two points. First, Watson (1994) explains how a researcher is most vulnerable to non-invertibility when her VAR excludes measures of important endogenous variables that depend on streams of expected future values of other variables. This is the situation in our example with the currency-to-demand deposit ratio: it offers information about quantities that help to reveal the true value of the states, something that the external finance premium, a price, does not do. Second, this example illustrates how difficult it can be to guess the invertibility result ex ante. It does not seem obvious or intuitive which of the two specifications 17 of the VAR is invertible. Consequently, this example justifies the potential importance of our theoretical results in section 2 as a device to help researchers to check for invertibility.
